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Abstract 
 
Brazil and India are two of the important emerging economies of today. A comparative study of the two country’s 
economic regulations is interesting and can give useful learning for both countries. Their similarities in terms of large 
geographical area, large size of population, high unemployment rates, dominant services sector, a mixed economy 
framework, common interests in international markets and trade platforms like WTO (pharmaceuticals, agriculture, 
etc.) on the one hand and contrasts by way of political experiences, economic upheavals, dependence on foreign 
financial flows combine to make this a rich and meaningful study (Oliver Stuenkel, 2010). The paper aims at 
identifying the reasons that have helped India to achieve rapid GDP growth and remain economically stable over the 
last quarter of a century and have also enabled Brazil, with a history of economic ups and downs to manage the 
effects of the 2008-09 crises quickly. The Brazilian economy posted positive economic conditions in barely a year, 
without resorting to large increases in government spending or monetary easing. This makes us think that the 
Brazilian economic regulations model has matured. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Origin and Nature of the 2008 Global Crises 
It is now well documented that since latter half of 2008 the world has faced one of the most severe 
financial and economic crisis since the Great Depression. The crisis may have begun as a sub-prime 
mortgage crisis in the US but subsequently it had spread to Europe and later to the rest of the world. 
(Bülent Gökay, Darrell Whitman , 2010). It was manifested as a widespread banking crisis in the US and 
Europe, implying a collapse of both domestic and international financial markets, and then later became a 
global macroeconomic downturn. Countries like Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal to name a few are still 
struggling with slowdown, unemployment, deficits , debts and liquidity constraints that are being met 
with quantitative easing both from domestic and foreign support. (Grahame F. Thompson, 2010). In spite 
of repeated injections through fiscal and monetary measures the outlook for these economies remains 
uncertain and pessimistic. In its World Economic Outlook, October 2008, the International Monetary 
Fund forecast global growth of 3.9 per cent in 2008 and of 3.0 per cent in 2009. These projections were 
subsequently revised downwards to 3.7 per cent for 2008, and 2.2 per cent for 2009( Global Economic 
Crises and its Impact on India, Rajya Sabha Secretariat,2009).Many economists consider this to be one of 
the worst global recessions since the 1970s and some also feel it to be comparable to the Great 
Depression of 1929. The effects of the recession are perhaps more serious and widespread as the world 
has become increasingly globalized. An integration and interaction of economies into a  global economic 
arena has established multiple linkages and transmission channels across political borders that has 
possibly spread the recent crises from its place of origin in the USA to other superpowers in Europe or 
Asia like Japan. The spread of globalization also, led to the emergence of the concept of EMEs. Emerging 
market economies today are attractive destinations for trade and investment flows from the developed 
nations. Of these, the two democracies of Brazil and India are the largest EMEs and are holding much 
global interest as large potential markets. The two nations are also, noteworthy in the context of the 
current global recession as they have managed to easily and quickly weather the effects of the global 
crises without much burden on Government finances and without drastic structural changes in economic 
policies. This is important in a world where many Central banks are responding to the developments by 
aggressive and unconventional injection of liquidity, monetary easing and overall relaxation of collateral 
norms and eligibility criteria for their lending to financial institutions, along with supportive fiscal 
measures and governance directives. 
This paper seeks to analyze the effects of the 2008 recession on the two EMEs of Brazil and India 
through a look at estimates for GDP growth, exports, FDI flows and foreign exchange reserves. 
Evaluation of existing state of the economies at the time of crises outbreak along with the then prevailing 
planned economic policies has been carried out to assess why the effects were less intense and less 
widespread in these countries compared to others . This meant that relatively not much upheaval occurred 
in the macro economy or in the policy formulation and implementation in these EMEs. We follow up the 
analysis with the safeguard measures that the two governments took to protect their economies from the 
crises triggered downfall, along with relating them to the context of the past and current needs of the 
economy. 
 
2. Did the crises carry into EMEs like India and Brazil? 
 
It is important to analyze the macro picture to assess the extent to which the crises affected Brazil and 
India in order to realize which macroeconomic targets were affected significantly and those which were 
not much shaken. This also, has to be done in context of the time frame that the negative changes lasted 
and thus, assess whether economic policy makers had a fresh and challenging role to play in resolving the 
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crises related issues. The global financial crises emphasized the role and importance of USA as a pivot of 
global finance. It has been well recognized that regional financial crises, in the past, can occur without 
seriously impacting the national economies across the world. But when the US financial system stumbles, 
it brought down other major parts of the rest of the world. However, those who believe in decoupling hold 
that the European and Asian economies especially emerging ones, have broadened and deepened to the 
point that they no longer depend on the US for growth, leaving them insulated from a severe slow down 
there. They contend that it is possible for globalization and decoupling to coexist. Even, data suggest 
decoupling is no myth (World Economic Outlook, Update IMF, and January 2009). This is because in 
case of big emerging markets like Brazil and India have their own consumption and investment demands 
that are large and thus, their dependence on the US for providing demand is less. Further, the fact that 
Brazil exports 3 % and India exports 4 % of its GDP to US also, bears out the reduced dependence on 
American markets of these economies. The large own domestic markets of the EMEs like Brazil , India 
and of course, China can provide a degree of insulation from recession in US but the spread of 
globalization along with the  depth and width of the present crises have resulted in a slowdown to a some 
extent in these countries as well. 
The global financial and economic crises thus, did not leave Brazil and India entirely unscathed. This is 
borne out by the quarterly GDP growth rates for the two countries given in Tables 1 and 2. However, what 
is noteworthy that the recovery was getting under way and could gather momentum by the end of 2009. 
While there was deceleration in the quarterly GDP growth rates for India during 2008 and 2009, Brazil 
did experience negative growth in 3 quarters. The severity of the decline in GDP growth was much less 
than for the OECD countries (taken by us to represent the developed nations) as per Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table1: Quarterly GDP of Brazil, seasonally adjusted, 
percent change over previous year 
 
Quarters Growth 
Q1/08 
Q2/08 
Q3/08 
Q4/08 
Q1/09 
Q2/09 
Q3/09 
Q4/09 
6.4 
6.6 
7 
0.8 
-2.9 
-2.7 
-1.8 
5 
Source: OECD-Quarterly National Accounts 2010 
Table 2: Quarterly GDP of India, at constant prices, percent 
change over previous year 
 
Quarters Growth 
Q1/08 7.8
Q2/08 7.5 
Q3/08 6.1 
Q4/08 5.8 
Q1/09 6.0 
Q2/09 8.6 
Q3/09 6.5 
Q4/09 8.6 
Source: Press Information Bureau Government of India, 
Central Statistical Office (CSO) 
Table 3: Quarterly GDP of OECD countries, seasonally 
adjusted, percent change over previous year 
 
Quarters Growth 
Q1/08 2.2 
Q2/08 1.3 
Q3/08 -0.1 
Q4/08 -2.9 
Q1/09 -5.5 
Q2/09 -5.1 
Q3/09 -3.8 
Q4/09 -0.8 
Source: OECD-Quarterly National Accounts 2010 
Table 4: Quarterly Exports of goods and services of OECD 
countries, seasonally adjusted, percent change over 
previous quarter 
 
Quarters Growth 
Q1/08 1.9 
Q2/08 0.3 
Q3/08 -1.3 
Q4/08 -6.7 
Q1/09 -8.4 
Q2/09 0.4 
Q3/09 3.4 
Q4/09 2.9 
Source: OECD, Quarterly National Accounts 2010 
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The impact on growth in exports was felt due to the widespread nature of the global crises in Brazil 
and India as well (Table 4). The year 2009 showed significant decline in export performance of both the 
countries (Table 5). The impact on all trade flows is illustrated for Brazil and India through Tables 6 and 
7.The exports in visible goods showed larger declines that were partially offset by the import adjustment. 
As a result, the trade balances worsened but less than exports and were more so in the early part of the 
crises. Of course, the worsening in trade balances was more serious in case of India than Brazil. The 
worldwide recession and the country which is the global leader in Foreign Direct investment, USA, being 
worst hit meant that the adverse effects on FDI flows were bound to be noticeable. Both inward and 
outward FDI flows for the two countries declined in response to drying of liquidity, increased risks and 
curtailed market size. Brazil was more sensitive to changes in FDI flows (Table8) on both inward and 
outward account from 2008 to 2009 as compared to India (Percent change of volume of exports refers to 
the aggregate change in the quantities of total exports whose characteristics are unchanged. The goods 
and services and their prices are held constant, therefore changes are due to changes in quantities only). 
 
Table5: Export Growth Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (World Economic Outlook 2011)  
 
Table 6: Trade performance of Brazil - visibles (quarterly results), in billions ofU.S. dollars* 
 
Quarter Export Import Trade balance 
 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 
Q1 38.7 31..2 35.9 28.2 2.8 3.0 
Q2 51.9 38.8 43.4 27.8 7.5 11.0 
Q3 60.3 41.9 51.9 34.5 8.4 7.3 
Q4 47.0  41.8  5.2  
Year Exports (Per cent change) 
 India Brazil 
2000 10.69 10.04 
2001 4.85 9.56 
2002 14.37 8.63 
2003 15.71 15.66 
2004 23.65 19.2 
2005 18.88 9.3 
2006 13.82 3.32 
2007 17.13 5.4 
2008 10.62 -1.88 
2009 0.66 -10.75 
2010 10.22 9.13 
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Source: *Managing the Crises- Brazil Country Report (Banco Central and Secretaria de Comércio Exterior / Ministério do 
Desenvolvimento) 
 
 
 
Table 7: Trade performance of India - visibles (quarterly results), in billions of U.S. dollars 
 
Quarter Export Import Trade balance 
 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 
Q1 48.0 38.4 74.0 58.6 -26.0 -20.2 
Q2 57.4 39.1 82.6 78.0 -25.2 -26.2 
Q3 53.6 43.4 92.7 72.9 -39.1 -29.5 
Q4 39.4 47.12 74.4 65.4 -34..9 -30.9 
Source: RBI – Handbook of statistics of Indian economy 2010-2011 
 
2.1. Effect on industry 
  
The impact of deceleration of GDP growth was felt more intensely on the industry and manufacturing 
sectors in the two nations. The decline in industrial and manufacturing outputs was continuous in Brazil 
from October 2008 and continued at an average rate of decline of 7% next year as well. (Carmem Feijó, et 
al., 2009). 
 
Table 8: FDI Flows 
 
Year FDI Flows(millions of dollars) 
 Inward Outward 
 India Brazil India Brazil 
1995-2004(Annual 3789 19174 824 1885 
2005-2007(Annual 17766 22824 11501 12595 
2008 42546 45058 19397 20457 
2009 35649 25949 15929 -10084 
2010 24640 48438 14626 11519 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2011 
 
The industry sector in Brazil was particularly affected as it was hit in three ways. First of all, exports 
of manufactured goods fell significantly during the last quarter of that year, by approximately 37%. The 
greatest problem that the Brazilian exporter faced was a sharp drop in sales to emerging countries. The 
decline in export demand globally did contribute to the poor performance especially as the nature of 
industrial products was technologically underdeveloped in Brazil. The performance for Indian industry 
was better though fluctuating and exhibits decline and recovery for the 12 months corresponding to the 
peak of the crises in the 2 countries (Tables 9 and 10). 
 
Table 9. Industrial output of Brazil*  
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Month Industry Manufactured products
Jul(2008) 6.88 6.91
Aug 6.44 6.43 
Sep 6.81 6.79 
Oct 5.94 5.86 
Nov 4.77 4.66 
Dec 3.10 3.06 
Jan(2009) 1.02 0.99 
Feb -0.96 -0.99 
Mar -1.89 -1.90 
Apr -3.88 -3.93 
May -5.03 -5.04 
Jun -6.47 -6.48 
Jul -8.04 -8.05 
Source: *Managing the Crises- Brazil Country Report (IBGE, based on a twelve month index) 
 
2.2 Foreign exchange Reserves 
 
The estimates for foreign exchange reserve positions are more stable for both the countries. Some fall 
in reserves from October 2008 to May 2009 was observed, but due to cautious foreign exchange policies 
the reserve position did not deteriorate significantly. In Brazil this was possible with support from the 
depreciation of Real in 2008 and in India due to conscious policy and focus of Government on foreign 
exchange reserves. A repetition of the 1991foreign exchange crises should not happen is critical for the 
Indian economy and the fall in value of rupee further helped in export recovery. Also, India was an 
attractive destination for financial flows from the rest of the world due to financial and economic stability 
and orthodox economic policies of the government. 
 
Table: 10 Industrial Index of Production of India 
 
Month Industry  Manufactured products 
Jul(2008) 144.3 154.3 
Aug 141.9 151.4 
Sep 148.6 160.1 
Oct 146.2 154.6 
Nov 139.7 146.9 
Dec 148.3 156.3 
Jan(2009) 144.4 150.7 
Feb 138.5 144.8 
Mar 153.5 159.7 
Apr 139.6 145.5 
May 144.3 150.8 
Jun 145.7 153.4 
Jul 146.7 155.3 
Source: RBI – Handbook of Statistics of Indian Economy 2010-2011 
 
2.3 Capital markets 
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The volatility in portfolio flows is always more than that in FDI flows so, the impact of global 
financial turmoil was felt particularly in the equity market in 2008. Indian stock prices have been severely 
affected by foreign institutional investors' (FIIs') withdrawals. FIIs had invested over Rs10, 00,000crore 
between January 2006 and January 2008, driving the Sensex to an all-time high of 20,000 over the period. 
But from January 2008 to January 2009, FIIs pulled out from the equity market partly as a flight to safety 
and partly to meet their redemption obligations at home. These withdrawals drove the Sensex (Stock 
market index) down from over 20,000 to less than 9,000 in a year. It seriously crippled the liquidity in the 
stock market (Ajay Chhibber, Thangavel Palanivel, 2009)Brazil’s financial markets had undergone a 
transformation in recent years that had attracted investors. Changes in rules for publicly traded companies 
empowered small shareholders and improved corporate governance.  
 
Table 11: Foreign reserves of Brazil (at the Banco Central do Brasil), in billions of U.S. dollars* 
 
Month Foreign Reserves 
2008 2009
Jan 187.5 200.8
Feb 192.9 199.4 
Mar 195.2 202.5
Apr 195.7 201.3
May 197.9 205.6 
Jun 200.8 208.4
Jul 203.6 211.9
Aug 205.1 219.1 
Sep 207.5
Oct 203.2
Nov 206.4  
Dec 206.8
Source: *Managing the Crises- Brazil Country Report, Banco Central do Brasil 2010 
 
Table 12: Foreign reserves of India (at the RBI), in billions of U.S. dollars 
 
Month Foreign Reserves 
 2008 2009 
Jan  248.6 
Feb  249.2 
Mar  251.9 
Apr 314.1 251.7 
May 314.6 262.3 
Jun 312.0 265.1 
Jul 306.1 271.6 
Aug 295.3 277.5 
Sep 286.3 281.2 
Oct 252.8 284.3 
Nov 247.6 288.1 
Dec 255.9 283.4 
Source: RBI – Handbook of Statistics of Indian Economy 2010-2011 
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Among the most important of these was Brazil’s convergence with International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). Listed companies in Brazil report their consolidated financial statements under IFRS, 
as do Brazil’s financial institutions. Also, a stable currency, fiscal balance and increased confidence set 
the stage for favorable developments in Brazil’s capital markets. Growing activity in Brazil’s equity index 
(BOVESPA) helped to re-ignite interest in buying emerging market assets through initial public offerings. 
The best performing stock market in 2009 was that of Brazil. The São Paolo-based BOVESPA Index 
BVSP surged 145 percent in dollar terms. (BOVESPA is the fourth largest stock exchange in the 
Americas in terms of market capitalization). 
 
3. State of economy and policy stance before the crises 
 
3.1. Political Backdrop  
 
In India the current ruling Party was formed shortly after the 2004 elections, the United Progressive 
Alliance (UPA). It was a ruling coalition led by the Indian National Congress (INC) party, along with the 
Left Front, and has pursued policies targeting two different issues: inclusive growth and containing 
inflation.  When the global crises hit, UPA-I was in its last year before the general elections of 2009. 
After the Left Front withdrew support because of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, UPA-I comfortably survived 
a trust vote in Parliament in August 2008, which gave it enhanced credibility. Overall, the public 
responded favorably to the government’s management of the crises. The UPA was voted back into power 
in the general elections of 2009 with a slightly higher share of the vote than it had received in the 
previous election. However, this gain was possibly more a vindication of UPA’s overall management of 
economic matters rather than a specific endorsement of the way in which it handled the economic crises 
specifically (Jayati Ghosh ,2009). The Politics of Brazil takes place in a framework of a federal republic, 
with a presidential representative of the democracy. The President of Brazil is both head of state and head 
of government, and of a multi-party system. Executive power is exercised by the government. Legislative 
power is vested in both the government and the two chambers of the National Congress. 
A strong executive, led by a charismatic and very shrewd politician was in place in 2008. When it 
came to executive powers, the then president had exerted a clear, strong leadership. This also applied to 
his relationship with state governors, some of whom are members of parties in the opposition. Powerful, 
organized social groups, such as the syndicates, rallied behind him. Consequently, despite the inevitable 
criticism and opposition, in overall terms, there really was almost no policy controversy surrounding the 
crises response. (Renato G. Flôres Jr., Bertelsmann Stiftung ed., 2010). In political terms, the financial 
crises brought about another victory for President Lula da Silva. He successfully took Brazil through the 
uncertainties of a crisis that wreaked havoc in many developed economies of the world. He even 
participated in a collective loan to the IMF—something which Brazil has never done before. Indeed, the 
country emerged from the crises more confident about the model it adopted domestically and more 
assertive as a respected actor on the international stage. His power and clout can be judged by the fact that 
in 2010, President Lula's handpicked successor, Dilma Rousseff, was elected to be the first woman 
president of Brazil.  
 
3.2. Economic Policy  
 
The beginning of India’s present period of growth dates to 1991, when the Indian government 
introduced a cycle of economic reforms, focusing on a model of liberalization, privatization and 
globalization. With the exception of industrial de-licensing, most of the initial reforms concerned the 
external sector. They included the elimination of quantitative restrictions (QRs) on exports and the 
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rationalization and elimination of export subsidies, the latter of which were replaced by a system of 
export incentives. Further reforms included a reduction in import duties, moving away from an officially 
fixed rupee and allowing the market to determine the exchange rate, introducing a liberal policy on 
foreign institutional investments, and opening up the country to foreign direct investments (FDI). 
However, because of the federal nature of the constitution, reforms in the domestic economy are matters 
for the individual states and therefore, except for the financial sector most domestic reforms were slow. 
(Bibek Debroy, Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.), 2010). Before the crises, Brazil was faring well in 
macroeconomic terms, thanks to an unexpected continuity between the President Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso mandates (1995-1998, 1999-2002) and the President Lula da Silva administrations (2003-2006, 
2007 until 2010), with the Banco Central do Brasil playing a major and strongly consistent role. High 
interest rates managed to keep inflation at bay, while an overvalued Real proved to affect the trade 
balance less than had been expected. (Philip Arestis, Fernando Ferrari-Filho, and Luiz Fernando de Paula, 
2011) .Public debt was kept reasonably under control, and the treasury’s performance suggested that the 
government‘s cash flow was being cautiously managed. Country had good foreign exchange reserves and 
for the first time was a net creditor in the foreign market (Renato G. Flôres Jr., Bertelsmann Stiftung 
ed.,2010). 
In Brazil the Budget is proposed by the Ministry of Planning in consultation with the Ministry of 
Finance and the Spending Ministries have to observe limits and norms established by them. The Brazilian 
budget system is very centralized in the Ministry of Planning and includes a medium term plan of four 
years called the Pluriannual Plan. The country has a federal fiscal structure. Tax reforms enlarged the 
power of federal government and reduced tax based infighting among states and municipalities in the 
country. One of the tasks taken up by the Brazilian government in response to the IMF was to enact the 
Fiscal Responsibility Act in 2000 in support of transparency and fiscal stability in the medium and long 
term.( Ministry of Finance Japanese Government ,2004)This has improves fiscal management and control 
over public debt and public deficit in the country. Public accounts and the budget itself in all levels of 
government are very open, timely and transparent giving to the public, the media and the members of 
Parliament and parties to appraise public performance permanently and regularly. (Supplementary Law 
101, 2000). Brazil’s tax system was complex and conducive to predatory tax competition among the 
states and burdensome on labour. Overcoming these weaknesses is of utmost importance and it is 
proposed to unify state level VAT legislation across the country, to replace federal levies on enterprise 
turnover and payroll by a federal VAT and to alleviate the tax burden on labour income. 
4. Reasons why effects of crises were less severe and curtailed within a year? 
In India the high rates of gross domestic savings, 38 percent of GDP, and of gross capital formation 
39.1 percent of GDP, enabled the economy to be in a strong self-financed growth position. This gave 
strength to the economy and was in contrast to spending bubbles created elsewhere. While foreign capital 
flows added to the investment and growth rates, sudden changes in these only led to increased volatility in 
the short run but the long run growth consequences were limited. The foreign reserves position was 
comfortable. A small Current account deficit of 1.5% of GDP was thus, manageable inspite of reduced 
foreign capital inflows. 
 India’s primary macroeconomic imbalance was not external but related to domestic fiscal 
responsibility. In 2003, the government had passed a Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Bill 
(FRBM) and subsequently the individual states then passed similar legislation. This law mandated a fiscal 
deficit-to-GDP ratio of 3 percent in 2008-09. In fact, the fiscal deficit was 2.7 percent of GDP in 2007-08 
but jumped to 6.2 percent in the following year. The deficit scenario becomes more serious when we 
include a gross fiscal deficit of 2.3 percent of GDP contributed by states in 2007-08 and further when 
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financing through oil and fertilizer bonds is also treated as a fiscal deficit component. Thus, the fiscal 
stimulus introduced after September 2008 though not large, widened the deficits that were largely caused 
due to existing fiscal responsibilities. 
Brazil felt the financial crises most strongly at the end of 2008 and the industry sector proved more 
sensitive to the problem. Inspite of this the economic situation began to improve in the second quarter of 
2009. Macroeconomic consolidation along with a sound set of policies that focused on inflation targeting, 
a flexible exchange rate, prudent fiscal management, improved external liability position provided the 
ground for the Brazilian economy’s resilience against the 2008 crises (Economic Survey of Brazil, 
OECD, 2009). Brazil’s debt market was under exposed. Consumer debt was low and, in general, 
consumer liabilities were short term. Unlike the case of Europe and the US, the home mortgage debt was 
also, very low. In fact, property loans only accounted for 2.3% of the GDP in December 2008(José 
Roberto Mendonça de Barros, 2010). Financial innovations were limited. Resort to derivatives, and 
especially derivatives on derivatives, though practiced by the larger financial agents, was at least 
apparently modest. 
During the Cardoso years, problems in the financial sector e.g. the banking crises in the 1990s were 
addressed by a comprehensive restructuring of the domestic banking system referred to as the PROER 
program. PROER helped the sector, but (correctly) set stricter controls and tough prudential rules, some 
with no match in developed economies. Public funds were used to avert the most serious bankruptcies and 
a solid, though more concentrated sector emerged (Renato G. Flôres Jr., Bertelsmann Stiftung ed.,2010). 
This restructuring also affected other areas of finance, including those related to derivatives. Beyond the 
Banco Central do Brasil, a special chamber (or clearing-house) to manage and control over-the-counter 
operations related to all kinds of financial assets, Câmara de Custódia e Liquidação (CETIP) had been 
created in 1986. CETIP, for instance, had its powers revamped and made more effective during the crises 
period  (Renato G. Flôres Jr., Bertelsmann Stiftung ed.,2010). The minimum leverage requirement of the 
Brazilian banks at the time was 11%, much higher than the 8% ratio usually recommended by the Basel 
agreements. However, even greater caution was actually applied, as a 16% capital/asset ratio was the 
effective position of the Brazilian banking system at the time. Thus, when the crises struck, the necessary 
institutions and measures were already in place. Enjoying this nearly optimal macroeconomic condition, 
Brazil only suffered from the crises via globalization-related channels, particularly the trade and financial 
ones, and not due to domestic inefficiencies in policies and measures. 
 
4.1.  Policy measures for Recovery 
 
Growth of Personal Incomes was good in both Brazil and India even after the crises. The focus on 
inclusive growth by the governments of the two nations played a positive role in increasing incomes.  
In the case of Brazil, the domestic market was fuelled by the comprehensive government-sponsored 
PAC public works program, a solid and streamlined banking system and social programs. In global terms, 
the last of these raised the income of large numbers of people who were erstwhile excluded from the 
benefits of economic development and turned them into members making up the huge, attractive 
Brazilian consumer market. Like other countries, India made aggressive use of both monetary and fiscal 
policy, with a total fiscal stimulus that increased the fiscal deficit above the planned level by almost 4 
percentage points. This fiscal accommodation for the crises led to an increase in fiscal deficit from 2.7 
percent in 2007-08 to 6.2 percent of GDP in 2008-09.  
In India, in January 2009, the Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council stated, “The incremental 
transfer payment of 5 percent of GDP to the household and corporate sector through subsidies and tax 
reduction is large by any definition. It may be argued that much of it antedated the financial crises, but the 
fact is that its disbursement overlapped the crises and would have the same effect had the transfers been 
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conceived at a later date”. India’s relatively good performance on personal incomes was supported by 
endogenous and rural sources of growth through hikes in procurement prices, National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Schemes and farmers’ debt relief. The Government launched three fiscal stimulus 
packages between December 2008 and February 2009. These stimulus packages came on top of an 
already announced expanded safety-net program for the rural poor, the farm loan waiver package and 
payout following the Sixth Pay Commission Report, all of which added to stimulating demand. The 
combined impact of these fiscal measures is about 3 percent of GDP(Rajya Sabha Secretariat , 
Government of India2009). 
The prime minister’s address to industry on November 3, 2008 “Our first priority was to protect the 
Indian financial system from possible loss of confidence or contagion effects. I am happy to say that the 
direct exposure of our banks to problem assets is minimal. Our banks are well regulated and also well 
capitalized. I think we have successfully conveyed to our people that our banking system, both in the 
public and the private sector, is safe, and the Government stands behind it and that no one should fear for 
the safety of bank deposits. We have also taken several measures to infuse liquidity into the system to 
ensure adequate flow of credit.” 
India put in place a system of sound financial regulations to ward against the crises. The RBI did not 
resort to continuous monetary policy easing as unlike Brazil India was facing inflationary processes. 
However, through the Reserve Bank’s actions, the amount of primary liquidity potentially available to the 
financial system at the time was 7 percent of GDP. The RBI also took measures to address the issue of 
systemic risk, which included prudential capital requirements, exposure norms, liquidity and asset 
liability management, reporting requirements, corporate governance and disclosure norms, etc. 
Along with this, RBI’s attempt to prevent rupee appreciation helped in accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves. RBI also, bought dollars so that reserves were favorable, but while adding to domestic 
money supply. This along with increases in global oil and commodity prices led to double digit inflation.. 
In August 2008, the annual WPI-based inflation was 12.8 percent. RBI responded to the pressure by 
tightening monetary policy. High interest rates that resulted from heavy borrowing to finance deficit by 
the government led to further slowing of growth. The real interest rates fell, due to inflation, but the 
nominal rates were high.  As a result, GDP began to slow down even before September 2008. (Refer 
Table 13). 
 
4.2. Inflation rates within limits in Brazil 
 
The Brazilian economy began to improve in the second quarter of 2009. One of the most important 
factors was the perception that inflation, the eternal enemy during recessions, would continue to fall. The 
soundness of the institutions and the cautious monetary policy was consolidated by the revaluation of the 
Brazilian Real. The system thus began to accept the idea that the cost of living would remain within the 
4.5% target, which in fact occurred, as the final numbers showed that the IPCA (Official Consumer Price 
Index) increased by 4.3%. Naturally, keeping inflation low meant that the government could safely pursue 
a policy of monetary easing and fiscal stimulus without worrying about inflationary outcomes (José 
Roberto Mendonça de Barros , 2010). Once Stabilization was not an issue, the government could focus on 
expansionary policies, most of which focused on both the fiscal and monetary side. Between October and 
December 2008, the following measures were introduced in Brazil: a reduction in some prudential 
requirements (i.e., compulsory deposits to be transferred to the Banco Central); providing 7 billion Real 
to Brazil Development Bank (BNDES) as well as an additional 5 billion in order to finance pre-shipment 
and other export operations; changes in a few rules to allow for the offer of extra Real 10.5 billion for the 
agricultural sector and a special program for providing operating capital to firms in the building and 
construction sector. A further increase in public expenditures was again authorized in 2009 together with 
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an easing of credit conditions, specially for the less well-off and small and medium-sized enterprises. The 
Banco Central do Brasil also, began reducing the basic interest rate.  
 
Table 13: Inflation in Brazil and India 
 
Year Inflation(average consumer prices  in per cent ) 
 India Brazil 
1990 8.97 2947.73 
1991 13.87 477.38 
1992 11.78 1022.45 
1993 6.36 1927.38 
1994 10.21 2075.82 
1995 10.22 66.00 
1996 8.97 16.00 
1997 7.16 6.92 
1998 13.23 3.20 
1999 4.67 4.85 
2000 4.00 7.05 
2001 3.77 6.83 
2002 4.29 8.42 
2003 3.80 14.78 
2004 3.76 6.59 
2005 4.24 6.88 
2006 6.17 4.19 
2007 6.37 3.63 
2008 8.34 5.67 
2009 10.88 4.89 
2010 13.18 4.99 
Source: International Monetary Fund (World Economic Outlook 2011) 
 
The set of policies on monetary and fiscal fronts was almost together, the Ministério da Fazenda 
(Finance Ministry) having taken collective action in early 2009. Most measures had either a reduced time 
frame—a few months, in the case of tax waivers for boosting consumption, for instance—or were once 
and for all decisions, like the setting of extra credit lines at BNDES, Brazilian Development Bank (Banco 
Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social) or the payroll increases that helped to increase 
disposable incomes. A rough estimate has been put that the funds directly mobilized for the stimulus 
would still be only around 1.5 per cent of the 2008 GDP.  
The macroeconomic regime implanted in Brazil during the second administration of Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso, and largely maintained by his successor, is typical of those adopted in other developed 
countries. The anchor is provided by an inflation-targeting regime (with a target inflation rate somewhat 
greater than in most advanced countries, of 4.5 per cent a year, with a band around it of +/–2 per cent). 
The exchange rate is flexible-float. The float is often described as free, but given the extent of recent 
reserve accumulation it would not qualify as a true free float. 
Fiscal policy was actually more ambitious and revenue generating under President Lula da Silva’s 
regime, resulting for a time in a primary surplus (Fiscal deficit minus interest payment is primary deficit) 
of at least 4.25 per cent of GDP. Monetary policy had then been directed at achieving the inflation target 
given fiscal policy, which—given history—has implied maintaining high interest rates. 
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At the onset of the crisis the Central Bank of Brazil had quickly provided smaller banks with a strong 
liquidity cushion. This put them in a stronger position and they could adjust their portfolio without any 
banks failing. Commercial lines of credit in US dollars were simultaneously set up, using foreign 
reserves, in order to provide liquidity for exporters. (Valerie Cerra, et al.,2008) The Banco do Brasil 
played a key role in the operation. In fact, the main public banks (Banco do Brasil, Caixa Econômica 
Federal and Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social) expanded their loan portfolios 
dramatically. Finally, interest began to be reduced more systematically down by 500 points in a year, 
which obviously helped to turn credit around. The Treasury also reacted by speeding up revenue 
expenditure and it did so in two ways: (1) by again increasing the public sector payroll; and (2) by 
increasing social security spending and transfers to the private sector. As mentioned earlier this added to 
the growth of personal incomes. It was found, for example, that the total payroll of the public sector for 
2009 was up by more than Real 17 billion, which represents nearly 40% of the estimated growth for total 
personal income in Brazil. Thanks to the higher salaries, civil servants and pensioners were granted loans 
that they spent on purchasing goods to the tune of nearly Real 22 billion. (José Roberto Mendonça de 
Barros , 2010). 
On the fiscal front, taxes were lowered for a series of products, the lowering of the car tax being the 
most significant. In fact, this sector became a special case as its sales recovered dramatically. This was a 
good strategic decision, as it was aligned with control of inflation. Cars are given a high weight of in the 
Price Index (vehicles carry an 8% retail price weight in Brazil). 
Fiscal stimulus measures taken by the governments of the two countries were made more feasible as 
the public debt of both nations at the time was at manageable levels.( Table 14) 
 
Table 14:  Government Gross Debt 
 
Year Government Gross Debt(Per cent GDP) 
 India Brazil 
2000 71.44 65.66 
2001 75.84 70.20 
2002 80.12 79.80 
2003 81.20 74.69 
2004 81.23 70.62 
2005 78.83 69.14 
2006 75.72 66.66 
2007 72.98 65.17 
2008 72.99 70.66 
2009 71.10 67.85 
2010 69.17 66.06 
Source: International Monetary Fund (World Economic Outlook 2011) 
 
For open economies with flexible exchange rate systems like Brazil and India the expenditure 
multipliers tend to be low and so fiscal measures fail to create large income changes.( Ethan Ilzetzki, 
2011). Also, across the board cuts in interest rates have to be handled with care in countries watching to 
keep inflation in control. Combined with the worry on foreign exchange reserves, in keeping them 
comfortable, the regulatory controls on the banking system and the financial flows were the most used 
policy responses. However, what was noteworthy was that significant structural and systemic changes 
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were not required to handle the crises effects and the economies could nevertheless recover easily and 
quickly. 
 
4.2 Major downfall was in exports, especially in India 
 
From April to August 2009, exports declined by 31 percent in U.S. dollar terms, compared to a similar 
period in 2008. In August 2009 alone, they declined by 19.4 percent. Interest subvention on pre-shipment 
and post-shipment export credit was given. Export incentives in the form of duty drawback, or its 
conceptual equivalent, the DEPB (Duty Entitlement Passbook Scheme) were extended. However India’s 
response to the crises did not include any buy Indian clauses. However, customs and countervailing duties 
were raised, a move made possible by the existing gap between applied and bound rates. Export 
restrictions were relaxed, but quantitative restrictions on exports and imports of several agricultural items 
were and are determined by what is happening to food price inflation. The high dependence on crude oil 
imports and the experience of 1990-91 caused India to err on the side of caution in accumulating foreign 
exchange reserves. The level of reserves was sub-optimal in the sense of being excessive with low yields, 
since they are invested in safe assets. The ratio of foreign exchange reserves to total external debt was 
137.8 percent and the ratio of short-term debt to foreign exchange reserves was 15.2 percent. Unlike the 
balance of payments crises in 1990-91, all external debt indicators were sustainable and nowhere near 
crises levels and as we saw in Table 12 the foreign exchange position was comfortable (Bibek Debroy, 
Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.), 2010). In addition to growth in domestic consumer demand as mentioned 
earlier, Brazilian exports also, began to enjoy a positive impact from the strong recovery of the Chinese 
economy. In 2009 China became the largest trade partner of Brazil and was the destination for 13% of 
national exports from Brazil. At the same time, the share of US in exports from brazil fell to 
approximately 10% and moved to second place.  
Industrial exports however, could not keep pace with the growth rate of commodities exports due to 
the low technological component in the exports of Brazil which are more inclined to be resources based. 
However, bio-technology and offshore oil were two of the four areas of currently greatest technological 
progress (along with IT and aeronautics/astronautics) that were part of Brazilian exports. Also, being a 
global trader, with diverse markets, Brazil is able to use the fact that there is always a type of client (like 
China) with expanding markets. Brazil pursues a commercial policy that is dynamic, always looking to 
open new markets and fighting against protectionism.  A positive turnaround in the economy was thus, 
visible from the second quarter of 2009 itself. In fact, the recovery of Brazil was faster than India, in 
contrast to earlier historical patterns of high volatility in Brazil and stability in India. 
5. Conclusion 
Brazil and India were able to weather the crises without deleterious effects comparable to other worst 
hit countries across the world. This was due to the state of the macro- economic indicators and policies 
prevailing at the onset of the crises in large measure. Quick responses in monetary policy and fiscal 
measures were made to an extent. However, the important implication was that no deeper structural 
policies, like corporate tax cuts, company bail-outs or support to business, were made to handle the crises 
effects in Brazil. In case of India also, there was no institutional restructuring undertaken that could be 
ascribed to the crises. The crises did not contribute to any remarkable changes in financial regulation and 
supervision or result in creating new institutions such as so-called bad banks. 
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